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The impact of new life sciences innovation on political theories of 
justice 
THEO PAPAIOANNOU1 
Abstract 
New life sciences innovation offers the possibility of new conceptions of human 
nature with significant impact on liberal theories of justice.  So far, nature as such has 
been thought to be something given and beyond human control. Thus, to define 
something as natural has meant the same thing as to relegate it to the realm of fortune 
or misfortune, rather than justice or injustice. However, the successful decoding of the 
human genome and subsequent advances in genomics-based technologies begins to 
change this conception to a new one: nature can be something dynamic and within 
human control. Therefore, genomics-based technologies can make possible the just 
distribution of natural goods (rationality, intelligence, etc). Can liberal political 
theories successfully deal with this new possibility of justice? This paper addresses 
the question by briefly assessing Rawls’ egalitarianism, Nozick’s libertarianism and 
Sen’s capability theory of justice. It is argued that these theories fail to address the 
new possibility of justice made feasible by life sciences innovation. On the one hand, 
libertarianism is insensitive to natural inequalities. On the other hand, egalitarianism 
and the capability theory of justice are limited to compensating for natural inequalities 
and avoid ensuring just distribution of natural goods. Contemporary liberal theories 
are not dynamic enough to deal with distributive justice in the 21st century.    
Introduction 
New life sciences innovation offers not only the prospect of applications with 
profound impact on social and economic life but also the possibility of new 
conceptions of human nature with significant bearing on political theories of justice. 
So far, nature as such has been theorised as something given and beyond human 
control (i.e. chance). Therefore, to define something as natural has been to relegate it 
to the realm of fortune or misfortune (i.e. fate) rather than to the realm of justice or 
injustice (i.e. responsibility).2 Political theories from Hobbes3 and Locke4 to Rawls5 
and Nozick6 clearly retain this distinction between the two realms. However, the 
successful decoding of the human genome and subsequent advances in genomics-
based technologies (including biotechnology) create expectations of new diagnostic 
tools and genetic interventions7 which begin to change this static conception of nature 
to a new one: nature can be something dynamic and within human control (i.e. 
choice). This implies that nature can be changed to accord with the requirements of 
justice. To put it another way, genomics-based technologies may make it possible to 
realise what so far has been thought to be impossible: the just distribution of natural 
goods such as health, strength, talent, rigour, intelligence, imagination and lifespan. 
Some of these goods (e.g. intelligence and imagination) are generally assumed to 
characterise human nature, distinguishing it from animal nature.8 The question that 
arises is: can contemporary liberal theories deal with this new possibility of justice?   
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The aim of this paper is to address the question by briefly assessing Rawls’ 
egalitarianism, Nozick’s libertarianism and Sen’s capability theory of justice. These 
theories constitute the core of contemporary political liberalism.9 However, it will be 
argued that they fail to address the new possibility of justice put forward by life 
sciences innovation. On the one hand, resource-based theories such as libertarianism 
are insensitive to natural inequalities. On the other hand, egalitarianism (also a 
resource-based theory) and the capability theory of justice are limited to compensating 
for natural inequalities and avoid ensuring just distribution of natural goods. In some 
respects this is due to their fixed conception of human nature and their internal 
contradictions. Contemporary liberal theories are not dynamic enough to deal with 
distributive justice in the 21st century.    
 
This paper is structured as follows: firstly we discuss new life sciences innovation and 
explain how it redefines human nature; secondly, we examine whether contemporary 
liberal theories can deal with the new possibility of justice; and finally we conclude 
that neither Rawls’ egalitarianism, nor Nozick’s libertarianism, nor Sen’s capability 
theory are dynamic enough to address the new possibility of justice in the 21st 
century. 
New life sciences innovation and the redefinition of human nature 
The term ‘new life sciences’ marks a shift from 20th century genetics to 21st century 
genomics and post-genomics. This shift is characterised by a series of scientific 
innovations, the most important of which is the successful decoding of the human 
genome in 2000. The Human Genome Project (HGP) focused on the characterisation 
and sequencing of the human genome and the relationship between gene activity and 
cell function.10 Since the completion of the HGP and the discovery of, in President 
Clinton’s words, ‘nothing less than the language of God’, it has been hard to keep up 
with the pace of innovative developments in new life sciences, let alone their 
applications to key sectors of the economy and society. Take for instance the health 
sector. In terms of specific technologies, genomics and post-genomics offer the 
prospect of development of new gene-based diagnostics and identification of 
underlying genetic components of diseases. Also the introduction of personalised 
medicine promises treatments designed for individual patients (i.e. pharmacogenetics) 
while the development of gene- and cell-based therapies, including gene therapy and 
the use of stem cells, create expectations not only for preventing and/or curing 
diseases but also for enhancing human beings.11 Genetic enhancements aim at 
improving fundamental natural goods, including strength, talent, rigour, intelligence 
and imagination. This would happen by means of new life sciences innovation, 
especially by manipulating DNA and rewriting genetic codes through somatic cell 
engineering (SCE) and germ-line engineering (GLE).12 These technologies promise 
alteration of the genes in all cells in the human body. Finally, the development of 
synthetic biology promises to design and engineer biologically based parts of novel 
systems as well as redesigning existing natural biological systems.13       
              
Scientific and technological innovation has impact on our conceptions of human 
nature. What is important is the boundary between human control (choice) and what is 
beyond human control (chance). As Dworkin recognises, “[t]he whole network of our 
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moral and ethical convictions shifts when technology or discovery makes any 
dramatic change in the boundary between the two”.14 Although scientific and 
technological innovation from the 17th to the 20th centuries had a crucial impact on 
people’s conception of human nature, generally speaking a clear division between 
chance and choice was maintained. 15 This resulted in the development of the classical 
liberal idea of justice that is limited to distribution of social goods such as property, 
income and wealth. By contrast, natural goods such as intelligence and imagination 
were thought not to be distributable in terms of justice. Take for instance the 17th 
century theorists Hobbes16 and Locke17. Both promote justice and peace through 
governmental protection of individual rights to private property but neither 
emphasises the role of natural goods in civil society. Morally significant goods, say 
intelligence and imagination, are considered to be fixed properties of human nature 
and therefore beyond each individual’s choice.  
 
It might be argued that 21st century life sciences innovation has the potential to close 
this division between chance and choice, introducing a new possibility of justice that 
goes beyond the distribution of social goods.18 Indeed, the ability to manipulate DNA 
and rewrite genetic codes, as well as the possibility of applying engineering principles 
to design new biological systems (i.e. synthetic biology), have changed static 
perceptions of nature. Some (morally significant) natural goods and capacities, 
previously perceived as fixed properties and capacities of human nature, may soon be 
distributable and therefore a matter of choice. As Jasanoff points out:  
 
The molecularisation of the life sciences, which enables us both to 
“read” and manipulate characteristics beneath the visible surfaces of 
living entities, poses particular challenges to principles of 
governance based on orderings and classifications … We can 
contemplate altering the human genome so as to produce enhanced 
human beings, with characteristics that today would be regarded as 
out of the ordinary, even superhuman. What then is nature and what 
is being human?19  
 
This crucial question has preoccupied philosophers and political theorists since the 
beginning of the 21st century. The ability to intervene directly in the human genome 
and rewrite part of the genome has forced philosophers such as Fukayama20 and 
Kass21 to defend the boundary between chance and choice, arguing that new life 
sciences innovation might endanger human nature. This argument is not only based on 
the problematic assumption that there are such things as fixed properties of human 
nature but also on the view that these properties are by definition good.22 However, 
other theorists such as Habermas clearly accept that “…the boundary between the 
nature that we ‘are’ and the organic endowments we ‘give’ to ourselves disappears”.23 
This disappearance provides the basis for redefining or transcending human nature. 
The latter can no longer be seen as a given entity of fixed characteristics.  
 
 
 
As Buchanan et al point out: 
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A theory that purports to base justice or morality generally on a fixed 
human nature cannot tell us whether justice or morality permits or 
requires us to alter ourselves in fundamental ways, including ways 
that change what has been taken to be our nature.24  
 
What such a theory can tell us is how to establish the basic structure of society so that 
we can politically protect the fruits of some natural goods and/or compensate for the 
absence of some other natural goods. Indeed, this is the case with the classical liberal 
theory of the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries.  
 
Given that the classical liberal theorising of justice has been founded upon 
assumptions about human nature, any redefinition or transcendence of human nature 
can gradually begin to develop theoretical presuppositions of a new possibility of 
justice, i.e. justice that is no longer constrained by human nature.  
Contemporary liberalism and the new possibility of justice 
Contemporary liberalism consists of egalitarian, libertarian and capability-based 
political theories which reconstruct classical liberal arguments of justice. Such 
reconstructions mainly take place in the 20th century but influence the debate about 
justice in the 21st century. Thus, Rawls25 develops his egalitarianism upon the social 
contract tradition of Rousseau and Kant while Nozick26 reconstructs Locke’s 
libertarianism and Sen27 critically modifies the liberal arguments of Smith, Condorcet 
and J. S. Mill. Although contemporary liberal thinkers do not seem to be explicitly 
preoccupied with the new possibility of justice, it might be useful to explore whether 
their arguments implicitly preclude their extension or revision to genomics or 
preclude their use in building new theoretical frameworks which extend to genomics-
related questions. 
Rawls 
To begin with Rawls, his starting point is that the natural lottery is no less morally 
arbitrary than the social lottery. According to him, “No one is thought to deserve his 
greater natural capacity or to merit a more favourable starting place in society”.28 
However, the moral arbitrariness of the natural lottery does not seem to justify direct 
intervention in the human genome for equalising natural capacity. Despite opposing 
interpretations29, Rawls is clear that although no one deserves his greater natural 
capacity, morally arbitrary distinctions which are due to the natural lottery should not 
be eliminated or scaled down. In his theory, there is another way to deal with them: 
the basic structure of society can be arranged so that these morally arbitrary 
distinctions can work to everyone’s advantage. Rawls is convinced that the system 
can be justified to all and therefore to the least favoured ‘representative man’. This 
arrangement can be achieved through two principles of justice: the equal liberty and 
the difference principles. 
                             
Both principles apply to major social institutions and require specifications of the 
notions of advantage and benefit, assigning weights to certain primary goods. Rawls 
defines primary goods as “…things which rational persons may be presumed to want 
whatever else they want”.30 However, as Farrelly correctly observes: 
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Rawls divides these goods into two groups – social and natural 
primary goods:  
 
Social Primary Goods (SPG): rights and liberties, powers and 
opportunities, income and wealth, and self-respect. 
 
Natural Primary Goods (NPG): health and vigour, intelligence and 
imagination. 31 
 
Indeed, Rawls’ theory of justice claims that only the SPG can be equally distributed 
unless unequal distribution of them is to everyone’s advantage. Thus, Farrelly 
correctly raises the issue: “But what about the NPG? Why does Rawls not include the 
distribution of them in the principles of justice?” 32 First, it might be argued that the 
non-inclusion of the distribution of NPG in the principles of justice does not imply 
that Rawls regards natural inequalities as falling outside the domain of justice. As 
Buchanan et al stress: “Rawls’ remarks about the moral arbitrariness of natural 
inequalities …mean that in some sense he regards natural inequalities as falling within 
the domain of justice.”33 Second, even if this is the case, Rawls claims that NPG are 
not directly under the control of the basic structure of society. This claim is due to his 
classical liberal conception of human nature that constrains a new possibility of 
Rawlsian justice. As Rawls confesses “…the feasible ideals of the person are limited 
by the capacities of human nature and the requirements of social life”.34 Rawls does 
not consider how innovation redefines conceptions of human nature and 
revolutionises debates concerning social justice. That is not to say his theory is 
completely irrelevant (it would be unfair and anachronistic if we so argued, since his 
A Theory of Justice was written in 1971) but it is an ideal theory that does not pay 
much attention to ‘real issues’ in politics such as the role of technological innovation. 
Rawls’ idealism has been already criticised by several political theorists, including 
Barry,35 Farrelly36 and Mason.37  
 
However, his neglect of innovation is particularly important because it minimises the 
relevance of his theory for modern life institutions. As Buchanan and Keohane argue, 
given the crucial role of innovation in modern life, theorising about social justice 
should not ignore the potential of innovations to ameliorate injustices.38  This is the 
reason why followers of Rawls such as Farrelly attempt to extend Rawls’ theory to 
address issues raised by new life sciences innovation. Farrelly proposes a revised 
theory of justice that incorporates Rawlsian principles to govern the distribution of 
NPG. His starting point is that: “It is no longer viable to invoke the standards of social 
justice from a world where it was only the SPG that were directly under the control of 
the basic structure.”39 Farrelly is convinced that the future society will be one where 
the distribution of NPG will be under the control of the basic structure. This raises the 
question of the principles which should govern the distribution of NPG.  
 
 
As an answer, Farrelly proposes a ‘genetic difference principle’ (GDP).  
 
This principle states: GDP: inequalities in the distribution of genes 
important to the NPG are to be arranged so that they are to be the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged.40  
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Farrelly argues that this principle does not invoke the old standards of traditional 
property and privacy rights. However, it is not clear whether GDP complements these 
standards or applies to the basic structure of society as an entirely new principle. 
According to Farrelly: “The rights to property and privacy are given a priority in 
Rawlsian justice because they are crucial for allowing people to pursue their rational 
plans of life. But are they more important than one’s natural endowments?”41 
Farrelly’s answer is negative because he takes private ownership of information in the 
human genome to mean that the NPG of the rich are going to be cared for, while the 
NPG of the poor are going to be neglected. It might be said that even if rights to 
property and privacy are no longer a priority, the application of GDP to the basic 
structure of society does not imply that the NPG of the poor are going to be cared for. 
There is an epistemological problem of defining the least advantaged in terms of 
NPG. Who are the least advantaged?  
 
This question is also raised by some prioritarians who investigate which individuals 
qualify as members of the worst-off group of society. For instance, Lindsay42 insists 
that severely cognitively impaired individuals qualify as members of the least 
advantaged group and for this reason they deserve massive transfer of socio-economic 
resources from the rest of society. However, it is not clear why this genetically 
disadvantaged group should be given priority over other genetically disadvantaged 
groups. Nor is it clear why victims of genetic diseases should be given priority over 
victims of socio-economic circumstances (e.g. those born in poverty). Farrelly’s reply 
to prioritarians such as Lindsay is that the interests of different disadvantaged groups 
need to be balanced one against another. The GDP does not trump those principles 
that govern the distribution of SPG. In addition, society should decisively deal with 
the issue of “which genetically disadvantaged group should be given priority over 
other genetically disadvantaged groups”.43 Farrelly’s reply fails to address the 
epistemological problem that is at the heart of prioritarian investigations: how can we 
define the least advantaged in terms of NPG?  
 
Even if we could provide a plausible definition of the least advantaged in terms of 
NPG, one question would still remain open: what does it mean to talk about the 
distribution of NPG being brought ‘under the control of the basic structure of 
society’? Farrelly’s GDP clearly permits inequalities in NPG to benefit the least well 
off but only by increasing the level of SPG. Farrelly is well aware of this problem but 
provides no solution. Instead he defends the reconciliation of “the principles 
governing the distribution of the SPG with those governing the distribution of the 
NPG”.44 Unfortunately, Farrelly is not clear about how this can happen. It might be 
said that only an abstracted difference principle can be applied to both SPG and NPG. 
This presupposes SPG and NPG are understood as interpersonal and interdependent 
goods of equal importance to pursuing a rational plan of life.  
Nozick 
Nozick’s starting point is opposite to that of Rawls: neither the natural lottery nor the 
social lottery is morally arbitrary. The reason for this is that: “Individuals have rights, 
and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their 
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rights)”.45 In Nozick’s theory, the most important inviolable right is that of self-
ownership:  
 
Every person is morally entitled to full private property in his person 
and powers. This means that each person has an extensive set of 
moral rights…over the use and fruits of his body and capacities…46   
 
The right to self-ownership implies that, even if the natural lottery is morally 
arbitrary, people are entitled to their natural goods and what flows from them. This 
entitlement is founded upon Nozick’s three principles of justice: acquisition, transfer 
and rectification.47   
 
These principles require that neither natural goods, such as intelligence and 
imagination, nor social goods, such as income and wealth, that flow from natural 
goods can be centrally distributed by means of life sciences innovation. Since 
individuals are self-owners, they are morally justified to do with their natural goods 
whatever they wish, provided they do not harm the non-consenting others. This 
implies that they are free to alter their own genetic profile or choose particular natural 
goods. Although Nozick reconstructs Lockean libertarianism, he does not have a fixed 
conception of human nature that prevents him from considering the role of science in 
debates of distributive justice. Thus, he defends positive genetic engineering as a 
means by which prospective parents might be able to choose genetic profiles for their 
children. According to Nozick: 
 
[M]any biologists tend to think the problem is one of design, of 
specifying the best types of persons so that biologists can proceed to 
produce them…They do not tend to think … of a system in which 
they run a “genetic supermarket” meeting the individual 
specifications (within certain moral limits) of prospective 
parents…This supermarket system has the great virtue that it 
involves no centralised decision fixing the future of human type(s).48  
 
 
The idea of allowing parents to alter or choose the genetic profile of their children is 
directed against any political state more extensive than the minimal state that might 
use life science innovation for creating certain types of people, maximising aggregate 
utility and welfare. This would violate the Kantian imperative that requires people to 
be treated as ends and not simply as means. However, the same idea might also result 
in some problematic parental choices. For instance,  Glover asks us to “[i]magine 
parents belonging to some extreme religious sect, who wanted their children to have a 
religious symbol as a physical mark on their face, and who wanted them unable to 
read, as a protection against their faith being corrupted”.49 In this scenario children are 
treated as simply a means for the satisfaction of their parents’ wishes. Nevertheless, 
neo-libertarians such as Savulescu reply that, in fact, “It is unlikely that any parent 
ever desires a child solely as an end in itself…”50 This argument opens the door to 
violations of child’s self-ownership for the sake of parents’ procreative autonomy.51 
According to Savulescu: 
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Procreative autonomy is the liberty to decide when and how to have 
children according to what parents judge is best. Parents know best 
their own circumstances, and ultimately it is parents who must live 
with and make sacrifices for their children.52  
 
The libertarian principle of procreative autonomy can lead to problematic parental 
choices simply because it allows parents to decide, according to their conception of 
the good, what is the best life for a child. Problematic parental choices might limit the 
child’s opportunities to lead an autonomous and meaningful life. In other words, as 
Habermas puts it, such choices might “carry the risk of harming the sense of 
individual autonomy as well as the moral status of persons so treated”.53 Habermas’ 
critique of ‘genetic libertarianism’ is important and raises crucial questions: How is 
one’s genome selected? According to whose conception of the good is one’s genome 
selected? Answering these questions might indeed have implications for one’s 
personhood so far as autonomy is concerned. One might think oneself less free than 
others, given that one might not have the means to alter one’s pre-selected genome 
according to one’s own conception of the good. This is incompatible with 
libertarianism as such. Therefore, it might be said that contemporary libertarianism, 
even though implicitly accepting the new possibility of justice, is limited by its 
internal contradictions.    
Sen 
In the Tanner Lectures on Human Values (1980), Sen asserts that what matters in the 
discussion of social justice is not the question ‘why equality’ but the question 
‘equality of what?’54 Although Rawls equalises SPG and Nozick equalises individual 
rights, Sen insists that what should be equalised is capability. In this sense, his theory 
of justice shifts focus from institutional structures to freedoms of people. Institutional 
structures only govern the means to freedom but do not provide freedom itself. Sen is 
critical of Rawlsian and Nozickian principles of justice because they become central 
issues in judging distributional equity. In his view, resources are merely the means to 
freedom for people to choose different kinds of life. As Sen explains: 
 
Justice cannot be indifferent to the lives that people can actually live. 
The importance of human lives, experiences and realisations cannot 
be supplanted by information about institutions that exist and the 
rules that operate … We have reason to be interested … in the 
freedoms that we actually have to choose between different kinds of 
lives.55  
 
This is what the notion of capability refers to: each individual’s actual freedom to 
achieve the functioning he/she values (leading an autonomous and meaningful life).  
Sen arrives at the notion of capability through his critical assessment of Rawlsian 
primary goods and the concept of utility or welfare. As Cohen points out: “Sen 
pleaded for a metric of well-being which measured something between primary goods 
and utility.”56 Indeed, Sen’s dissatisfaction with Rawlsian primary goods is founded 
on the notion that that some individuals are incapable of converting them into well-
being or welfare because of the variation in their natural characteristics. To put it 
another way, differences in NPG are sometimes determinants of the incapability of 
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individuals to convert SPG into valuable functions. As Daniels observes, this criticism 
derives from Arrow, “who noted that people who were ill or disabled might be worse 
off than others despite enjoying the same index of primary social goods”.57  Similarly, 
people who were less talented or less intelligent than others might be worse off, 
despite enjoying the same index of social primary goods. Here the problem is bridging 
the gulf between SPG and NPG that Rawls’ theory leaves unresolved. As has been 
argued, his difference principle only mitigates the effects on those with the worst 
NPG while the GDP posited by his followers (eg Farrelly) remains problematic. The 
question that arises is whether Sen’s capability theory of justice can bridge the gulf 
between SPG and NPG, going beyond Rawls to convert them into well-being.   
 
To be sure, variability in NPG is a source of inequality in capabilities and for this 
reason it requires adjustment. But what sort of adjustment? Is it just a simple 
adjustment of social and economic resources that can mitigate the effects of this 
inequality by compensating variability in NPG? Is it an adjustment of genetic 
resources (through the use of new life sciences technologies) that can eliminate the 
effects of inequality in capabilities by reducing variability in NPG? Or is it a complex 
and co-ordinated adjustment both of socio-economic and genetic resources that can 
first compensate for and then eliminate the effects of inequality in capabilities? It 
might be argued that Sen, despite the fact that he assesses well-being in terms of 
capability, fails to provide clear answers to these questions. This implies that his 
theory may be not very far from that of Rawls on the issue of NPG. To put it another 
way, Sen’s theory seems to be limited to the mitigation of effects of variability of 
NPG by means of adjusting socio-economic resources. Although the capability 
theory, by comparing freedoms (different functionings) instead of social primary 
goods and utility, appears to be more appropriate than Rawlsian egalitarianism to 
indicate where the injustices between people lie, it seems to be inappropriate (just like 
the Rawlsian egalitarianism) to eliminate them when adjustment of NPG is required.  
 
Sen concludes that: 
 
We are diverse, but we are diverse in different ways. One variation 
relates to the differences that exist among our ends and objectives … 
But there is another important diversity – variations in our ability to 
convert resources into actual freedoms. Variations related to sex, 
age, genetic endowments, and many other features give us unequal 
powers to build freedom in our lives even when we have the same 
bundle of primary goods.58  
 
What Sen is not clear about is whether, in equalising powers to build freedom in our 
lives, we are justified in using new life sciences technologies to reduce some 
variations related to genetic endowments. In fact, he leaves this particular question 
open. This incomplete account is the weakness but also the strength of Sen’s approach 
because it keeps it open to interpretation, avoiding perfectionism and paternalism. 
Thus, it is up to Sen’s followers to resolve the issue of extension of the capability 
approach to genomics. Some of his followers, such as Cooke59, suggest that his theory 
does not preclude its extension to genomics. On the contrary, they argue, if Sen’s 
argument for the moral obligation to redistribute resources towards capabilities is 
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right, then a similar argument can be made about a moral obligation to use life 
sciences innovation to genetically engineer individuals who would otherwise not live 
up to the threshold of their capabilities due to a preventable lack of certain NPG. 
Cooke, in particular, uses the example of GLE technologies to argue that liberal 
societies should alter germ-line to ensure basic level capabilities.60 Unfortunately, she 
overlooks that Sen’s theory is open-ended and does not support complete capability 
equality.  
 
However, some other followers of Sen, such as Nussbaum,61 are not open to new life 
sciences innovation. Rather, they explicitly argue that natural determinants of 
capabilities cannot be controlled through the use of new technologies. Thus, 
especially for Nussbaum, “it is still the social basis of the good, not the good itself 
that society can reliably provide”.62 This argument clearly fails to take Sen’s 
capability approach beyond Rawls’ theory, dealing with the new possibility of justice. 
More importantly, it seems to contradict Nussbaum’s idea of human dignity. She 
writes: 
 
The core idea is that of the human being as a dignified free being 
who shapes his or her own life in cooperation and reciprocity with 
others, rather than being passively shaped or pushed around by the 
world in the manner of “flock” or “herd” animal. A life that is really 
human is one that is shaped throughout by human powers of 
practical reason and sociability.63  
 
Nussbaum’s idea of human dignity is founded upon the Marxist conception of human 
life as a continuous process of emancipation. Thus it cannot justify a static situation in 
which human beings are passively shaped or pushed around by either nature or 
society. In this sense, human dignity seems to justify the use of new life science 
technologies for controlling the natural determinants of human capabilities. Whether 
this approach is a plausible alternative to contemporary liberal theories is an open 
question. What is certain is that it is a less narrow approach to genomics and post-
genomics questions of distributive justice than that of contemporary liberalism.                          
Conclusion 
This paper has sought to address the question of whether contemporary liberal 
theories can successfully deal with the new possibility of justice, namely, just 
distribution of natural goods such as intelligence and imagination, or whether the 
theories are precluded from being extended or revised to take account of new life 
sciences innovation. Three such theories have been examined: Rawls’ egalitarianism, 
Nozick’s libertarianism and Sen’s capability theory of justice.  
 
It might be concluded that, despite their differences, none of them is clearly able to 
address the issues that the new possibility of justice raises in the 21st century. Rather, 
contemporary liberal theories fail to lead us to ponder the right ethico-political 
questions in the genomics and post-genomics era (e.g. who are the least advantaged? 
How do we balance the duties to mitigate both the social and natural lotteries?).64 
First, Rawls’ liberalism equalises SPG and compensates for the worst NPG so that 
they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. Although Farrelly clearly 
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recognises the need for incorporation of Rawlsian principles to govern the distribution 
of NPG, he provides an incomplete and problematic account of egalitarian liberal 
genetic justice. Second, libertarianism, represented by Nozick and his followers, 
applies the old standards of property and privacy rights to govern the distribution of 
NPG. This application undermines the very essence of libertarianism, namely the 
autonomy of each individual and his/her ability to lead a meaningful life. Third, Sen’s 
capability theory, even though it recognises that variability in NPG is a source of 
inequality in human capabilities, fails to specify adjustments which can eliminate this 
inequality. Given the open-ended character of his theory, some followers of Sen (e.g. 
Cooke) argue for genetic interventions to ensure basic level of capabilities, while 
others (e.g. Nussbaum) insist that genetic determinants of capabilities cannot be 
socially controlled. However, there seems to be an alternative approach to genomic 
and post-genomic questions of distributive justice. That is the approach of human 
dignity, and it should be investigated for its plausibility.        
 
The inability of contemporary liberal theories to deal with the new problem of justice 
is a result of their failure to consider the impact of new life sciences innovation on the 
relationship between chance and choice. This failure is partly explained by the fact 
that they reconstruct classical liberal arguments founded upon fixed conceptions of 
human nature. Another explanation is that the science is not yet settled and therefore 
contemporary liberal theories cannot possibly come up with concrete conclusions. 
However, if one accepts that the acceleration of new life sciences innovation increases 
choice and decreases chance, one has also to accept the need for less narrow theories 
of justice which are able to capture this change by extending/revising to genomic and 
post-genomic questions of distributive justice. The task of these theories will be not 
simply to incorporate NPG into their arguments, but to do so in a way that will avoid 
genetic essentialism, i.e. emphasis on genetic factors rather than social practices. If 
the aim of justice is to extinguish both the influence of arbitrary socio-economic 
factors and brute luck on distribution, then a combination of both SPG and NPG must 
be incorporated into new arguments about justice.     
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